Austrian Economics and Business Ethics
Open Republic: July / August / September 2005


Norman Barry, University of Buckingham, Presented to the Department of Economics, University College, Cork, 12th March, 2004

 

The collapse of communism and the reduced appeal of even the more moderate forms of socialism has not brought an end to the criticism of capitalism, though the  attacks now come from a different source. It is not the alleged science of Marxism that provides the intellectual armoury but morality, something that Marx himself would have despised. For all its success in creating jobs and prosperity, capitalism normally fails the moral test. It is governed by greed, creates unacceptable inequality and social exclusion and destroys the environment; and global capitalism and free trade hinder the development of the Third World. The cause of capitalism has not been helped by well-publicised business scandals. I shall argue that it does not the fail the test of conventional Western morality, though criticism of certain practices are always appropriate, but only the demanding standards of contemporary business ethics, which if fully adhered to, would destroy the efficiency of capitalism. Such things as the 'social responsibility of business', the persecution of inside traders in the stock market and the moral attack on the takeover mechanism reveal a defective understanding of the nature and limits of morality as well as an abysmal knowledge of  business enterprise. I shall take Austrian economics as my intellectual lodestar because not only does it provide the most persuasive defence of capitalism in the free market tradition but some of its leading practitioners, especially Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek, wrote extensively on ethics and political theory. 

 

WESTERN MORALITY AND ANGLO-AMERICAN CAPITALISM

As we know, there is not one type of capitalism but a variety of economic systems that embody property, the profit motive, and the law of contract and tort. Although all capitalist systems work better with limited government it is by no means inconceivable that the free market system could operate with various forms of authoritarianism: it occasionally does, think of China. Some of these differences relate to ethics, or at least are reflective of distinct moral cultures. Anglo-American (or Anglo-Saxon) capitalism is distinguished by its individualism, utilitariarianism and anti-statism.

Furthermore, it is universalistic in that it believes that international trade should be free, it has the same logic and rationale as domestic exchange. National boundaries are artificial impediments to the free flow of trade.  Hence it tends to be the leading force for globalisation. It favours this for efficiency reasons; it ensures that the factors of production are allocated internationally in accordance with consumer preferences and, although it is somewhat understated, it is in conformity with ethical standards that are themselves capable of being universalised. Its minimal ethics guarantees the right of anyone, of whatever race, sex, religion or nationality, to trade.

In contrast, rival forms of capitalism, best exemplified by continental Europe and Japan, are less individualistic and more communitarian in their orientation. Firms are not just vehicles to advance shareholder value, they represent not merely owners but also other stakeholders who might have no equity interest in the firm at all. Managers of companies are restrained by duties that are owed non-owners (employees, suppliers and members of the community in which the firm is situated). The takeover method is eschewed because it would be both destructive of communal values and a threat to those adversely affected by corporate raiders. The ethics and economics of this type of capitalism are not universal.

Of course, capitalism of the communal variety can be just as competitive as the Anglo-American type but its internationalism is severely limited. However, despite is coolness towards individualism, the non-Anglo-American varieties of capitalism have produced some outstanding entrepreneurs. Also, they can also be just as immoral in Frankfurt and Tokyo as Wall Street and the City of London sometimes are. In continental Europe there is certainly an absence of shareholder pressure to ensure good management behaviour, just look at Parmalat.

It would be foolish to hold up business to the standards set by abstract moral philosophy, indeed business has developed its own restraints and rules of conduct more or less spontaneously, but an understanding of elementary moral philosophy is helpful in explicating the competing versions of capitalism. Utilitarianism, deriving largely from Jeremy Bentham but originating in the anti-rationalism David Hume, [1] evaluates human conduct by the consequences of various actions, not by the motives that inspire them: favourable consequences are normally understood in terms of pleasure, though utilitarians disagree on what exactly this goal or telos should be. It is obvious why the doctrine should appeal to economics and business for here human action is about maximising something to do with wealth. The contrast is with forms of deontology, normally associated with Immanuel Kant. [2] Here ethical principles, which are derived from pure reason, hold independently of consequences. Thus people are owed justice even if this entails a loss in utility. These principles play an oblique role even in the business world, for laws against insider trading (see below) are based mainly on the notion of fairness in the market. Nobody should have the advantage of access to privileged information, even though there may be good utilitarian reasons for the efficiency of insider trading. Modern business ethics tends to take a more deontological view of the evaluation of commerce than did previous writers. These types of principles are inherently intractable, contestable and less persuasive than utilitarianism. Austrian economics is almost exclusively utilitarian, even though a major exponent, Ludwig von Mises, adopted a Kantian view of general philosophy in his rejection any empirical foundation for economic theory. However, in some cases, it is a convoluted conception of utilitarianism.

Western capitalism proved to be successful partly because it rested on the minimum of morality. It made possible the sustaining of abstract economic orders in which people are identified solely by the fact that they are traders. Voltaire delivered a panegyric on the burgeoning stock market in London in the eighteenth century:
Go into the London Stock Exchange - a more respectable place than many a court - and you will find representatives of all nations gathered there for the service of mankind. There the Jew, the Mohammedan and the Christian deal with each other as if of the same religion, and give the name of infidel only to those who go bankrupt. There the Presbyterian trusts the Anabaptist and the Anglican accepts the Quaker's promise. [3]

By adopting such a minimalist ethic, Anglo-American capitalism could exploit the division of labour, develop flexibility and remain open to change and innovation via entrepreneurship. This ethic might be minimal but it is still an ethic. In fact in the absence of such generalised and internalised rules the policing costs of a capitalist system would be excessively high. Although these minimal ethical features are descriptive of all capitalist systems they predominate in the more individualistic and less regulated Anglo-American model. Modern business ethics, with its hostility to individualism, invocation of the community as a source of value not revealed by the market and desire to impose a more expanded notion of morality on market traders, has a vision of the economic system redolent of a pre-industrial, agricultural society in which people were held together by social bonds rather than by efficiency-inducing rules of exchange, especially contract. Such communalism is also productive of great rigidity.

AUSTRIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY

Ironically, the most sophisticated theory of the type of economy described above emanated from a country in continental Europe which, superficially, doesn't have those British traditions which seem more appropriate for capitalism; the common law, reverence for limited government, respect for property and contract and a Humean, anti-rationalist approach to social affairs. I mean Austria.  But the phrase 'Austrian political economy' has now no geographical significance: rather it suggests a distinctive attitude of mind and a distinct methodological orientation towards familiar social and economic problems. Most Austrians today are American.

The school of Austrian economics emerged from the subjectivist-marginalist revolution in economic theory in the 1870s. The main figures in this were Leon Walras, Stanley Jevons and the Austrian, Carl Menger. [4] It was primarily a theory of economic value which identified it in terms of choice at the margin. This replaced the prevailing objective theory of value, which measured it in terms of labour inputs (costs of production); that reached its apogee with David Ricardo (and, of course, Marx). The new approach was a much better explanation of value in a capitalist economy. It resolved the old 'diamonds and water' paradox - diamonds are useless but very expensive while water is valuable for human life but costs virtually nothing. Of course, as marginalism clearly explains, in the desert the situation is reversed. But this theory does not justify capitalism. It did, of course, establish methodological individualism, economic processes were reducible to individual choice at the margin, but there was no explanation of that moral individualism which lies at the heart of the ethical case for capitalism. Neither was there any explanation and justification for the typical capitalist institutions, such as the firm or the stock market.

Neither at this stage was there any account of entrepreneurship and profit which, although necessary, were to become very controversial. Indeed, the perfect equilibrium of the efficient market became in the 1930s the model for market socialism. [5] In this model every factor is paid its marginal product, entry into the market is costless, there is no 'profit' and, logically, no need for entrepreneurship. Capital would be allocated by the state somehow mimicking a market characterised by private ownership. [6]

After Menger, Austrian economists made important contributions to economic theory involving the extension of the principles of subjectivism and marginalism to all aspects of economic life. Eugen Bohm Bawerk was instrumental in the development of capital theory as well as providing a devastating critique of Marxism and Friedrich von Wieser discovered the theory of opportunity cost. However, all these contributions, important though they were, could be seen as part of positive economics, that is, concerned with the understanding of economic phenomena rather than with recommending any particular form. Of course, the early Austrians themselves believed in capitalism but rarely ventured into normative economics; indeed one, von Wieser, held what we would today call social democratic opinions. [7]

The open association of Austrian economics with capitalism was first espoused in the work of Ludwig von Mises. [8] He did make substantial contributions to pure theory, especially his theory of money [9] and the theory of the trade cycle, but he is remembered today for his rigorous defence of capitalism and searching critique of government and bureaucracy. His first venture was a demolition of market socialism [10] based on subjectivism and the state's inability to calculate without private property and capital markets. But perhaps his most enduring innovation was his invention of entrepreneurship because this made his theory very different from orthodox equilibrium economics. He argued that the market could not be co-ordinated by the state and that individuals require the lure of profit to draw them into productive activities.

But it is important to note here that Mises was not directly concerned with ethics nor was he that interested in defending the morality of profit. In fact, Mises's ethics were little more than an unsophisticated utilitarianism; even slavery appeared to be wrong merely because it was inefficient. [11] But what is interesting here is that Mises was uninfluenced by Kant's ethics (which were based on reason) yet his philosophy of science was distinctly Kantian. It was decisive in his economics.

For Mises, the truths of economics were known in advance of all experience: they  were a priori or apodictic. He starts from the fundamental proposition that man acts and his actions are designed to remove some present state of uneasiness, whatever that might be. All action is therefore rational, in contrast to some physiological movement such as a knee jerk or similar response to some abrupt change in the environment. With the action proposition and of a handful of subsidiary assumptions, such as the ordering of preferences and time preference, the whole of economic theory can be deduced without the need for any empiricism. Economic theory is not capable of verification or even falsification. In contrast, physical science deals with the causal relationships between measurable objects. But social science is not about anything observable, its concern is with the logical reconstruction of events. And it is to do with actions limited by the 'laws of necessity'. For example, the law of demand would not be refuted if a fall in price led to an increase in consumption. It might be peculiar but it is still a product of human action. Modern, orthodox economics shows some recognition of this whenever an economic proposition is preceded by the ceteris paribus clause.

But when it come to ethics, whereas Kant tried to demonstrate the grounding of moral principles in reason and the universalisability rule, for Mises they are a matter of taste, like the preference for a particular wine. The idea that nature can bestow 'rights' on man is treated with particular scorn: the worst of these delusions, he said, is that "nature" has bestowed on every man certain rights'. [12]   This goes beyond even Hume, who, although denying the ultimate rationality of ethics, still believed that a proper understanding of nature was the key to a plausible, even universal ethics. And Hume was a crucial influence on Hayek's rationale of capitalism.

What then are the ethics of capitalism for Mises? They are utilitarian and, using the universally true principles of economics, one can show that human well-being is satisfied by the free market, private property and strictly limited government. Again, this does not require any empirical demonstration. He says that 'anything that preserves the social order is moral'. [13] And capitalism preserves the social better than any known alternative. To the obvious objection, that since choices are necessarily subjective 'anything goes', Mises admits a mild empirical observation. In his  Theory and History, he claims that there is a '.a far reaching unanimity among people with regard to the choice of ultimate human ends.' [14] Egoism is the basic law of society and man is a restless utility maximiser; but unrestrained capitalism directs that irresistible human motivation towards harmony and prosperity. It should be noted here that Mises's utilitarianism owes nothing to the once fashionable doctrine that utility could be measured cardinally, that individual utilities could be compared and that redistribution was sanctioned because it maximised total social utility.

But of the necessary institutions of capitalist society, Mises says very little. What about the firm? Does that not depend on the coercive law of the state or does a spontaneous order, like the common law, generate, by voluntary contract, those features of the firm which we now associate with free market capitalism? There is no doubt that Mises would be contemptuous of contemporary fads like the 'social responsibility of business' but if such essential things as the limited liability of commercial enterprises are a product of positive or statutory law, then does he have any defence against the claim that these 'privileges' have to be earned by firms through their good works and relaxation of the pure profit motive?

It has to be said that despite his spirited defence of capitalism there is little in Mises that is germane to contemporary business ethics. He was too interested in the grand issues like capitalism versus socialism, the explanation of depressions, the opposition to Keynesianism and the errors of Marxism to be concerned with the nuances of capitalist society. His defence of capitalism was also a variety of rationalism, which has provoked criticism from that other Austrian advocate of private property and the market, Friedrich von Hayek. In his work, capitalism is derived from experience and tradition, its morality is a continuation of Hume's indirect utilitarianism and owes little to the a priori reasoning we associate with Mises.

Hayek first made his reputation as a professional economist, in the Austrian tradition, working on monetary theory and the trade cycle in the 1930s. He was known originally for his long-running dispute with Keynes; a battle that predated the General Theory, but he found notoriety with the publication of The Road to Serfdom, in 1944. [15] Although in the West Marxism was not an immediate threat, outright capitalism had few defenders and most people expected the coming post-war era to be characterised by considerable state welfare and extensive government intervention in the market. The Road to Serfdom upset this burgeoning consensus with its warning that even minor interference with market capitalism would result in a dire threat to the liberal order. After this, Hayek virtually abandoned pure economics and spent the rest of his life elaborating in law and political philosophy the central themes of The Road to Serfdom through books such as The Constitution of Liberty [16] and the three volume, Law, Legislation and Liberty. [17]

Although Hayek would not depart significantly from Mises's description of capitalism his intellectual foundations are different. There is little of the a priori approach and a much greater reliance on tradition and experience and, although he was a utilitarian, there is much less of the abstract reasoning that underlies Mises's version of that doctrine. He does not demonstrate the superiority of the market, private property order by theorising in advance of experience but shows how it emerges from the spontaneous development of a variety of social institutions, the common law being the most important, along with the market. In this approach, the tradition established by David Hume and the eighteenth century Scottish Enlightenment proved to be decisive.

Perhaps a convenient starting point is Hayek's theory of knowledge, [18] for it is the conceit of economic planners that they can have the economic knowledge, that is, of consumer tastes and productive possibilities,  that would be required for the planned organisation of a modern economy. But that knowledge is dispersed across a wide range of actors and has to be co-ordinated and it is here that Hayek makes use of the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur relies on 'tacit knowledge', that economic information that cannot be formulated in a precise form as the socialist planners presupposed; and here Hayek makes use of the philosopher's distinction between knowing that and knowing how. Ethics can be said to emerge in this way: it is not designed but consists of spontaneously developing conventions that have utilitarian value.

He used economic theory to refute egalitarianism: the attempt to equalise wages will be disruptive of the labour market and that factor will have to be allocated by force. It is certainly not consistent with liberty. But in a later work [19] Hayek specifically attacks the twentieth century obsession with 'social justice' and departed a little from the purely economic or allocational critique. He labelled it a 'mirage' which had no real meaning. It simply referred to am emotional response to the verdict of market in the distribution of income. It is a rationalist fallacy to suppose that a pattern of rewards could accord to some preconceived ideal, based on morality, without doing irreparable damage to efficiency, freedom and the rule of law. He makes no comment on the initial distribution of property rights from which exchange begins and this could not have been determined by the market. Of course, a Pareto- efficient allocation can result from any original distribution and Hayek says nothing about what should be.           

A more useful aid to the defence of capitalism is Hayek's account of the spontaneous development of law. He sees the emergence of a coherent legal system as exhibiting the same properties as the market, although in his early work he showed some appreciation for the code law system (especially German civil law). Hayek later became almost obsessed with the common law. [20] In contrast with its natural growth, the rational design of a legal code is subject to the same knowledge problem as a socialist economic plan. Important here is the fact  that since common law judges have a little more discretion than their counterparts in civil law, they can 'discover' rules that are appropriate to the preservation of a free order. It is also the case, as we shall see, that the flexibility of the common law allowed for the development of the 'company', which is crucial for the prosperity of capitalism, without the need for statute. Indeed, all of the features of the company can be derived the individualistic law of contract . And it is here that the doctrine of the rule of law becomes important, for Hayek's criteria for state action is not derived from  public good theory, least of all from some contestable moral licence for public over private action, but from a consideration of whether the proposed action can be made consistent with his, non-positivist, criteria of lawfulness. Laws must be perfectly general, name no one and be non-retrospective. To be consistent with his ideal of liberty, they must not be formulated as commands but as guidelines for individual activity. While it would not be logically impossible to frame the laws of a socialist society in this manner it is undoubtedly the case that the collectivism we are familiar with has proceeded through arbitrary and unpredictable command. Indeed, a capitalist market economy, open to all and operating according to known rules, is the only economic system that can meet fully with these criteria. It also preserves the moral value of liberty, although Hayek was more concerned with its value in the acquisition of knowledge than its role in 'self-development'. 

But there are still some important questions to be dealt with concerning law and capitalism. One problem concerns America, for although this is basically a common law country it has a kind of a code imposed on it. I mean, of course, the Constitution which does to an extent protect property and contract. In one controversial interpretation of the 14th Amendment, the 1905 case of Lochner v. New York, the Supreme Court struck down a New York statute which would have strictly limited the number of hours per week bakers could work. It was thought to be in breach of the 14th Amendment which was said to grant more or less unlimited freedom of contract. In those days, the Court would strictly scrutinise acts of legislatures which might abridge economic liberty and capitalism [21] but in the 1930s Lochner was overturned and in a 1938 case (Carolene Products v. United States ) it was ruled that there was a distinction between civil and economic liberties and that the Court would subject the former to much stricter tests of legality. The latter depend on the goodwill of the legislatures and their knowledge of economics: both have been shown to be in short supply. Since contrasting decisions can be shown to be consistent with Hayek's concept of the rule of law the connection between capitalism and legal processes is by no means as close as Hayek suggested. Indeed, the implication is that capitalism might require a more overtly moral, even rationalistic, defence.      

Another Austrian economist, Israel Kirzner, has taken the theory of entrepreneurship into the moral field. After distinguishing its role in markets from orthodox neoclassical equilibrium economics in a more or less positivist way, [22]   Kirzner later related it to a moral theory of justice. [23] He is concerned to stress that capitalism is a discovery procedure whereby individuals hit upon resources or innovative methods from which profit can be earned. This applies to all aspects of economic life. The entrepreneur is not the same as the capitalist, the former captures a profit while the latter merely earns interest; although both capacities may be embodied in the same person they are conceptually different. It is the entrepreneur's insight into the way natural resources might be used that creates economic value. For example, oil is merely a physical substance of no economic value until an alert person correctly anticipates its future uses.  The earnings of the entrepreneur are not required just for efficiency reasons, he is morally entitled to the whole of the value he creates according to the 'finders keepers' principle of conventional ethics. Even if one accepts Kirzner's reasoning that does not settle all arguments, for there is considerable doubt about the meaning of discovery. Kirzner himself give a controversial example. Somebody notices a valuable animal and shoots it. A passer by notices and appropriates it. Who is the legitimate owner? In this and similar cases Kirzner seems to imply that the person who physically posses it owns it. But is this genuinely the same as discovery? We shall look at the problems that may arise in the takeover process where doubts about the discovery of profitable opportunities often occur.

Kirzner has a radical conception of monopoly. Although Austrian free market economists have a very different idea of this from the neoclassical orthodoxy, they tend to regard most monopolies as being created by the state, they do concede the possibility of natural monopoly which might requite regulation. The limited state philosopher Robert Nozick [24] produces the example of the monopoly supplier of water in the desert and says that one person should not be in sole possession of something essential for life. Against this, Kirzner argues that even in the most unfavourable circumstances, it is always possible to establish legitimate ownership that is morally immune from the state. Somebody might have noticed the water hole and gone ahead of the others, so being entitled to sole possession. Whatever other moral objections one might have to this, the person still has the right to all the returns from this 'ownership'. It is achieved by discovery. In arguments familiar to those of the seventeenth century philosopher, John Locke, Kirzner suggests that because the water was originally unowned the discoverer has the right to full possession. However, one wonders whether anything so vital as water is truly unowned. It is most likely that there will be tribal rules and customs that allocate rights to use a scarce resource and these hold independently of a market allocation determined by entrepreneurship. Still, Kirzner is surely correct to highlight the fact that there are very few cases where ownership of a scarce resource cannot be established by market methods and the moral principle of finders keepers.

It might be thought that the morality contained within Austrian economics is rather meagre and that the problems that arise in contemporary business ethics require a more substantial body of social theory. However, it could also be the case that most of the issues that have been recently raised can be handled by normal political economy and by the moral conventions described by Hayek. I believe this to be the case and that much of the morality that business ethicists would like to impose on commerce is supererogatory, i.e. possibly desirable but not compelling. It may also distract attention from those conventional moral duties which are required by the market process and are compelling. I shall look at this problem through three controversial areas: the social responsibility of the corporation, insider dealing in the stock market and takeovers.

THE CORPORATION

The corporation, especially in its multinational form, has been a particular target of business ethics. The power it wields apparently belies the idealistic model of  capitalism where every participant is subject to competitive pressure, others can enter the market at will and individuals are free, responsible  agents who must bear the costs of their own actions. Instead, the corporation is now seen as, if not a monopoly, considerably protected from the competition described in orthodox neoclassical theory. Indeed, there is no room for the corporation in that purely individualistic model. The firm itself, in whatever form it takes, is something of a departure from theoretical market economics. In its pristine form 'business' is characterised as a series of contracts between economic transactors who obviously enjoy the maximum feasible economic freedom. But once a person joins the corporation he gives up some of that liberty. Obviously, he is free to leave the corporation but once he makes the bilateral contract he is under its authority and must do as he is told. Of course, the immense transactions [25] costs of the pure market model made it inevitable that the corporation would develop for efficiency reason. Indeed, it has been responsible for the progress of market economies through the raising of capital and the flexibility brought about by the easy exchange of shares; but it is something of a departure from the pure market model.

For a long time it has been argued that the existence of the limited liability corporation erodes proper ownership. For the nominal owners, the shareholders, do not exercise proper control. That has been ceded to the managers who constitute a new elite immune not only from the competitive pressures of the market but also from the authority of the owners. Adam Smith himself was critical of the joint stock company  because he thought that efficiency could only brought about by the owner-managed enterprise. Employees of the joint stock company would exploit the owners. As we shall see, the relationship between the agents, the contracted employees, and the principals, owners, is the permanent problem of capitalism and it turns up in a dramatic form every generation. We are going through  particularly lurid examples of it now with managers exploiting stockholders on the grand scale.    

There are two principled arguments that are relevant to this theme. First, how did the corporation develop and does its existence prove that not all efficient institutions are a product of the spontaneity of the market? Second, if the necessary features of the corporation are the product of statute law does that not validate a much wider range of corporate responsibilities than those implied in contract? In other words, are not corporations and their personnel responsible to society as well as their nominal owners?

It is the alleged privileges of the corporation that cause the controversy. It is a collective body (and this is a departure from market individualism) that can sue and be sued in court, it has a life that goes beyond the lives of its individual members and, most important, it has limited liability for debt and for torts; the owners only have their investment in the corporation exposed, not their private assets. It is argued that these 'privileges' did not evolve spontaneously but had to be a grant of society or the state. And the recipients of such advantages are under a moral duty to 'earn' them: hence the social responsibility of the corporation.  Austrians did not write about institutional economics and never noticed the difficulties the existence of firms and corporations might have for their market theories but it is possible to reconstruct their views from the main tenets of their political economy.

It can easily be shown that the corporation emerged spontaneously through the law of contract and it had existed long before regulation by statute. Although in all capitalist countries corporations are licensed and heavily regulated by legislation, this need not be the case. We have to use money issued by the state but this does not mean that private money cannot exist; and although corporations are now governed by statute this does not mean that they could not emerge from common law. Under analysis, the 'privileges' of the corporation turn out to be not originally a product of the state; they are not special to that institution but arise out of the rights of private persons. The corporation is not a kind of entity.

A corporate body emerges when number of private persons agree to pool their assets and create an artificial body with specific purposes determined by its charter. The corporation takes on burdens shared by its individual members  and the owners of the enterprise so created are entitled to the residual (profit). It appoints managers who have a fiduciary duty to act on behalf of the owners of the enterprise. If it is big enough the corporation can get a stock exchange listing and its shares become publicly traded. But this makes no difference to its logic. Size does not make the managers responsible to society, they still owe duties to the owners. The purposes of a corporation are determined exclusively by its owners. They might want to do good for society but if this were the case they would not have formed a business but a charity.   Fiduciary duty of employees to owners is crucially important here for despite all the depredations that capitalism has suffered from the state and statutory law it still remains as the fundamental feature of business in common law countries. The recent business scandals have involved clear breaches of fiduciary duties: Enron, Tyco and WorldCom clear cases of the exploitation of stockholders by managers; breaches of their fiduciary duties.

Limited liability emerged spontaneously through contract and no one is obliged to trade with a body that claims it. Indeed, even in the business world today commercial contracts are sometime made in which its extent is reduced and transactors become personally liable. Everybody dealing with a company is perfectly aware of the fact that he won't get all of his money back if things go wrong. There is some difficulty, however, with limited liability for torts for it is most unlikely that anybody would willingly sign a contract that allowed him to be harmed with no possibility of redress. It seemed to have emerged in American common law because of the difficulty of extending the notion of vicarious liability (whereby the master is liable for the wrongful acts of his servant) and is a regrettable consequence of the entity concept of the corporation; as if it were something separate from its owners. It led to the creation of one man corporations, by which individuals can escape liability. Limited liability for torts, partly because of the evasion of personal responsibility that it invites, is not consistent with minimalist business ethics or Austrian economics. It is not actually required for a market society; big companies could afford to pay damages and small ones could insure.

Although the personnel of the company may change over time and it might sometimes be difficult to identify individual wrongdoers in the case of corporate malfeasance, none of this is dilutes the individualistic foundations of the corporation. As Robert Hessen wrote: '(A)t every stage of its development (it) is a voluntary association based exclusively on contract'. [26] It follows from this that the recent invention of 'corporate crime' is just that, an invention. It is a collectivist departure from the ethical convention of personal responsibility for action.     

Perhaps the most insidious modern concept derived from anti-capitalist business ethics is the idea of the 'stakeholder corporation'. This began as the rather mild advice to companies that they should involve all employees more fully in the running of the organisation and the stakeholders were specifically confined to those who had a clearly definable role in it. But when modern corporations make pious references to their concern for all stakeholders in their annual reports, something different is meant. It has developed in such a way that, if all the injunctions of business ethics were to be taken seriously, the property rights of the company would be irreparably undermined. For the new stakeholders have become as important as formal owners. We are  told by prominent business ethicists, W. Evans and R. Freeman, that: 'The very purpose of the firm is to serve as a vehicle for stakeholder interests'. [27] The shareholders, instead of being decisive, are simply one of the groups that are to have an influence over such things as investment policy, takeovers, plant location and remuneration. Those who risk their capital in the company are to have no greater say than trade unions, suppliers and local residents.

Presumably policy will not be decided by managers responsible to the shareholders but by all affected parties sitting and voting in a company 'parliament'. But this will be disruptive of efficient management for a number of groups with divergent goals will be influential in decision-making. In fact, no decisions will be made at all for very soon an 'Arrow problem' will emerge. This, named after economist Kenneth Arrow, shows the impossibility of  decisions by majority rule if there are at least three possible decisions and three groups of voters. If votes are taken separately there will simply be cyclical majorities and no clear winner. [28] Under present company law, decisions are ultimately made by shareholders who can be assumed to have only one goal - the maximisation of shareholder value. There is then none of the problems involved with stakeholder capitalism. The answer to the difficulty of conflicting stakeholder groups given by stakeholder theorists, Evan and Freeman, is laughable. They are Kantians, not interested in the firm's profit and therefore blithely recommend the appointment of a 'metaphysical director' to reconcile the differing stakeholder groups. However, the person appointed to this exalted position would simply prolong the disputes up to the point at which the viability of the firm is threatened. Everybody is a self-interested utility maximiser, and philosophers are not exempt from this realistic description of human behaviour.

All of the ethical problems of corporations can be handled by conventional ethics and law. The imposition of supererogatory duties on corporations has no basis in business practice or in the individualism that powers Anglo-American capitalism. In fact, the emphasis on the higher duties has distracted corporate executive from the much more compelling basic moral duties. All of the persons involved in the business scandals of recent years had very high moral profiles, they gave to charity (often with company money) and were visible churchgoers. But they were lax in the elementary fiduciary duty of responsibility to shareholders. [29]     

INSIDER DEALING AND THE STOCK MARKET

This is an issue which has been the subject of recent well-publicised scandals: it has  disturbed ethicists even though the arguments against it have never been well-formulated and the statutory attempts to curb it are, by common agreement, not satisfactory. [30] Once again it can be illuminated by the Austrian theory of the market. It is not difficult to define. It is trading in shares in the stock market on the basis of information not available to others, outside shareholders, who have an interest in the firm: the information could be derived from employment in the firm whose stocks are being traded or from price-sensitive facts picked up from such personnel, in which case the guilty party would be a 'tippee'.

It is sometimes thought to be a 'victimless' crime in that there are no immediate people harmed, as in the case of a robbery, although it could plausibly be said that there are people disadvantaged by it. Some gain a lot, or reduce their losses, by buying or selling first. It is much more convincing to say that insider trading is unethical if it involves information which properly belongs to company owners and has not been revealed to them: timing is crucial here. And there is quite likely a breach of fiduciary duty if the information properly belongs to the owners.

In some jurisdictions, insider dealing is not a crime but a civil offence only (New Zealand), in others it is crime only and in most it is both a criminal and civil offence. It is thought to involve the moral concepts of equality and fairness but the notions of utility and economic freedom are relevant too. It matters more in Anglo-American economies because in these most of the capital for investment is raised on the stock market. The most spectacular cases involve takeovers where the unauthorised release of information can cause a dramatic rise in the share price. And this has an adverse effect on the prospects of a bidder. In continental Europe, where most capital is raised through bank loans, it is less important. Germany had no law against insider dealing until it was compelled to adopt the European Directive in 1994.

The arguments against insider trading derived from justice and equality are the least satisfactory. In current moral and political theory [31] justice has two meanings. It refers to the basic rules of a game, equal access to all potential participants and the outlawing of racial and sexual discrimination. This could be called equality of opportunity and certainly does not demand equality of knowledge. But justice is used in a much wider sense where it refers to equality of outcome and relies on the slogan   a level 'playing field'. While all Anglo-American stock markets can easily meet the equality of opportunity criterion it is clear that the latter is not only conceptually incoherent it is impossible to implement. There will always be inequalities of information and asymmetric knowledge in the stock market. Some people will know, quite legitimately, more than others. Indeed, it is the job of analysts in a competitive market to ferret out information that is not formally revealed. But the really tough laws in some jurisdictions seem to be designed to produce equality of outcomes and not just equality of opportunity. If successful they would turn the stock market into a lottery rather than a venue for the exercise of genuine skill. The real debate should be about what is meant by equality of opportunity.  

At the other end of the ideological spectrum, is the case for unrestricted insider dealing and here some help is available from Austrian economics. This starts from the assumption that markets are never in equilibrium but are being pushed towards it by the innovative actions of entrepreneurs alert to the possibility of profit. The stock market can be analysed just like any normal product market. Information is a scarce good and those who possess it should be entitled to a return. Markets are never perfectly efficient. If insider dealing were permissible information would circulate rapidly, so reducing profit. Big profits occur precisely because it is forbidden.

But the question turns on what is legitimate ownership; who rightfully owns the information that is used in capital markets? Is it the owners, or the people who discover it while working for the firm? If all of our working activity is entrepreneurial (as Kirzner maintains) then why should we not say that knowledge, even when working for the firm, partly belongs to the employee? Indeed, when tough laws are imposed on stock markets, they are in effect reassigning property rights: they are decreeing that all knowledge belongs to the employer. In the famous Texas Gulf Sulphur case (1968) [32] a firm made a valuable mineral discovery in Canada and those responsible for it bought stock in advance of the public announcement and made money when the disclosure was made. They were unaware they had done anything wrong and, by the tenets of Austrian economics, they hadn't. But they were charged with a (civil) offence by an adventurous interpretation of the Securities and Exchange Act (1934) and had to surrender their profits. This was followed by statutes in the US which formalised insider dealing as both a civil and a criminal offence.

An insider dealer had to be in a fiduciary relationship when he traded on undisclosed information and he must have profited from the deal. Some early cases were quite important in clarifying the issue and one or two were favourable to the accused. [33] Indeed, in one case it was said that there was no fiduciary duty to the market as a whole, a collectivist claim of the moralists.  British law (the Criminal Justice act, 1993) is even tougher than the American, for the definition of an insider is not limited to those in a fiduciary relationship but he can be anybody who possesses price-sensitive information, however acquired, and uses it in deals.

Most of the statutory law in Anglo-American economies is in contradistinction to Austrian economics because it offers serious impediments to the acquisition of knowledge. No analyst in Britain will now be seen talking to a company chairman, hitherto a regular part of his research, through fear of being adjudged an insider. Also, there is a real problem with the rule of law here for many transactors are uncertain about what is permissible or not. The laws do not have that predictability which is an essential feature of a genuinely liberal market economy.

A solution to the problem might be to repeal all statutory law and leave the matter to contracts between agents. It is the case that the demand for restrictions on insider dealing came not from outside shareholders but from moralistic activists. A firm could announce in advance that it permitted insider dealing in certain circumstances and under specified the conditions. Or it could say that it did not. It could always be sued for breach of contract if it broke some of the conditions. It might have an interest in motivating employers by offering them the prospect of profits from their discoveries. Of course, that may not work and employees might spend all their time playing the market and, perhaps, circulating false information. But these sorts of problems are best settled by the market, not the state.

TAKEOVERS

Takeovers are a very controversial feature of Anglo-American economies and most likely to arouse the ire of communitarian critics. [34] They disrupt established businesses, disappoint expectations, are offensive to national pride when foreigners grab valued assets and lead to an economy in which money-making through paper deals rather than genuine productivity is decisive. Most of these objections are emotional rather than rational, especially when they are linked to globalisation.

But there are some genuine ethical problems, none of which is fatal to the capitalist system. And they are rarely picked up by the moralists. We noticed earlier when discussing Kirzner's ideas about discovery in the market that there might be a problem in determining who made the discovery and who is entitled therefore to the profit. There was a famous takeover in Britain in the 1980s which raised this issue. The drinks company, Distillers, was known to be badly managed; it wasted shareholders' money and was not innovative. It was a sitting target for a takeover. The first to attempt one was James Gulliver, of the Argyll Group. He did an immense amount of research, especially on the financing of the deal. It was  expensive and had to be achieved by a share swap rather than a cash offer. However, Ernest Sanders of Guiness, who had been called in originally as a 'white knight' to ward off Gulliver, eventually took over in highly controversial circumstances. By what were thought to be dubious methods he managed to keep the price of Guiness stock high and to consummate his own share swap financing.

The abstract ethical question is, who was entitled to Distillers? Gulliver, who made the original discovery, or Saunders who 'grabbed' the company. Saunders, and others, were eventually convicted of criminal offences but the charges did not actually relate to the ethical issue discussed here. [35] It might be difficult to formulate into law a solution to the ethical problem but merely by alluding to it we are raising some doubts about Kirzner's theory of justice in discovery.

There are some other minor ethical problems that relate to takeovers. Is there not a temptation with 'buyouts' for managements to reduce the value of the shares so as to make their acquisition cheaper? Who is to blame when greenmail, the practice of a potential bidder, who builds up small stake in the company, being bought off at a  price not available to other stockholders, occurs? Are 'golden parachutes', very favourable terms paid to the top employees of the captured company, always necessary or acceptable? But it is difficult to see why the market could not solve these issues. Do we need the whole panoply of ethics to adjudicate on what is a necessary feature of normal business?

CONCLUSION

Contemporary business ethics shows a lack of understanding of business and the motivation that drives it, self-interest. Least of all do the moralists grasp the point that the public good comes about not by deliberate intention but is an unplanned by-product of private desires. Austrian economists understood Adam Smith's point well and perfected our knowledge of the working of the market system - especially the role of the entrepreneur. It is surely the case that the stress on the social responsibility of business would hinder the entrepreneurial process.

Anglo-American capitalism is undoubtedly individualistic and provokes those critics of business who recommend a more communitarian approach. Yet methodologically, individualism has proved to be a potent explanation of human action, and ethically, it is plausible account of how rewards and punishments in business should be distributed. They should go to those responsible for actions. The Austrian economists did not write specifically about business ethics but an analysis of their economic and social philosophy is illustrative of the position outlined here.    

The answer to the current 'crisis' in business ethics is not the propagation of supererogatory ethics, which if taken seriously would attenuate the efficiency properties of the market, but the reassertion of conventional ethics and uncontroversial law. They were first adumbrated by Hume and later spelt out more fully by Hayek. Important here is the fiduciary duty of managers to owners; it is in the interests of ordinary shareholders to resist rent-seeking by employees. This requires, of course, considerable shareholder activism, an activity indulged in more often by antic-capitalist pressure groups. They buy a few shares in the company and try to shift policy away from the maximisation of shareholder value towards what are basically political objectives. [36] Capitalism has to save itself.  

footnotes

[1] See Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,  ed. J.  Burns and H. L.A. Hart, London, Athlone Press , 1970.First published 1789. A more persuasive doctrine of utilitarianism is in the earlier David Hume's   An Enquiry into the Principles of Morals, Chicago, Open Court, 1930, section 5. First published 1751.For a contemporary view of Humean morality, see Norman Barry, 'Political Morality as Convention, Social Philosophy and Policy vol.  21 (2004), pp. 266-92. 

[2] Immanuel Kant, 'Metaphysical Foundations of Morals', in The Philosophy of Kant, edited by Carl J. Friedrich, New York, The Modern Library, 1993, pp. 154-229.

[3]. Quoted in D. Boaz,  Libertarianism: a Primer, New York, Basic Books 1997, p. 38.

[4] Menger's Grundsatze der Volkswirtschaftslere was first published n 1871 It was translated as  Principles of Economics, New York, New York University Press, 1976.

[5] Oska Lange, 'On the Economic Theory of Socialism', Review of Economic Studies, vol. 4 (1937), pp. 123-42.

[6] See N. Scott  Arnold, The Philosophy and Economics of Market Socialism, New York, Oxford University Press, 1990.

[7] Friedrich von Wieser, Social Economics, New York, Greenberg, 1927.

[8]Mises's important works are, Human Action, Auburn, Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998,first published 1949; Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis, Indianapolis, Liberty Classics, 1981. First published 1929. Theory and History, Auburn, Ludwig von Mises Institute,  1985. First published 1946.

[9]  The Theory of Money and Credit, New York, Foundation for Economic Education, 1971. First published 1912.

[10]Mises, Socialism.

[11] Human Action, pp. 624-30. , Of course, Mises's position here is entirely a result of his positivism in economics. Of course, he would have morally disapproved of slavery.

[12] The Anti-Capitalist Mentality,  p. 80.

[13]    Liberalism, Kansas, Sheed Andrews and McMeel, 1978, p. 34. First published 1962.

[14] Human Action, p. 241.

[15] The Road to Serfdom, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul,, 1944.

[16] The Constitution  of Liberty, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960.

[17] Law, Legislation and Liberty, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul; Rules and Order (1973), The Mirage of Social Justice (1976), The Political Order of  Free People (1979).

[18]  See The Constitution of Liberty, Part 1.

[19]. The Mirage of Social Justice

[20] See Hayek,  Rules and Order.

[21] See Bernard Siegan,  Economic Liberties and the Constitution, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1981.

[22]   Israel Kirzner, Competition and Entrepreneurship, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1973.

[23] Israel Kirzner, Discovery, Capitalism and Distributive Justice, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1989.

[24] . Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York, Basic Books, 1974, p. 180.

[25] . R. H. Coase, 'The Nature of the Firm', Economica, vol. 4 (1937), pp.  386-405.

[26] . Robert Hessen, In  Defense of the Corporation, Stanford, Hoover Institution, 1979, p. 43.

[27] . W. Evan and R. Freeman, 'A Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation', in  T. Beauchamp and N. Bowie,  Ethical Theory and Business, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1993, p. 82.

[28] . Norman Barry, 'The Stakeholder Concept of the Corporation is Illogical and Impractical', The Independent Review, vol. 6 (2002, pp. 541-55.

[29] . 'A Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation', p. 82.

[30] . See Norman  Barry, Business Ethics, London, Macmillan, 1998, chapter 5.

[31] . Norman Barry, An Introduction to Modern Political Theory, 4th edition, London, Macmillan, 2000, pp. 173-8.

[32] . See Barry, Business Ethics, pp. 96-97.

[33] . Barry, Business Ethics, pp. 96-99.

[34] . See Barry, Business Ethics, Chapter 6.

[35] . Ibid pp. 139-41. Saunders and is associates were convicted under a particularly repressive British statute, which was later ruled in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights  by the European Court of Human Rights.

[36] . See Norman Barry, Respectable Trade: The Delusions of Corporate Responsibility and Business Ethics , London, Adam Smith Institute, 2000. 

 

 

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